Avicennian Philosophy Journal
Year:2019 | Volume:23 | Issue:61 |Papers Count:12

According to the Ibn Sina's thoughts, there are subtleties and inner possibilities by which one would infer the various forms of God's transcendence. The main question of the present inquiry is what forms of God's transcendence would be presented based on the philosophy of Ibn Sina? In his philosophy, God's transcendence is usually analyzed and defined in the central concept of the contradiction of existences, but in this research, various forms of God's transcendence have been presented which include: non-associational existential transcendence, classical associational transcendence, individual transcendence, epistemological transcendence, logical transcendence, and lingual transcendence. The metaphysical distinction of existence and nature is the foundation of a fourfold distinction, which Ibn Sina offers in terms of existential transcendence. These fourfold distinctions are as follows: the difference between the essence in God and the essence in the possible existents, the difference between God's identity and the identity of the possible existents, the difference of God's unity with the unity of possible existents, the difference of God's attributes with traits of possible existents. According to each one, conceptual graduate unity of existence and Non-conceptual graduate unity of existence, which can be deduced from the philosophy of Avicenna, is possible to bring up for God non-associational existential transcendence and classical associational transcendence. Often contradiction of existence and confrontation with individual unity of existence is considered as one of the most interesting features of his philosophy. But the use of the allegory of the sun in explaining the way of existence of creatures as well as the use of the mystical interpretation of appearances for creatures by Ibn Sina makes it possible to speak of individual transcendence of God In his philosophy.

The inference of the best explanation is a type of non-deductive inference that was coined by Charles Sanders Peirce in his work on the logic of science. He introduced it as a new type of inference along with the already familiar inductive type and syllogism. Thus, the present inquiry aims to compare between this type of non-deductive inference with experience based on Avicenna's view. During this comparison, we seek to reveal all similarities and differences between experience and the inference of the best explanation. Also, we highlight some weak points of them. Their similarities are the presence of implicit premises and the scale of accounts of causality. Their differences are namely the best account's scales including simplicity, attraction and competitive in inferring the best explanation, which aren't considered in experience. However, the practicality of the scales is a matter of doubt. The other difference is the conditions and regulations added by Ibn Sina. Because In absentia and the absence of essential and accidental fallacies were not discussed in the inference of the best explanation.

Onto-Theo-logy recognizes the simultaneous presence of ontology and theology in metaphysics. In Onto-Theo-logy, God, in his metaphysical conception, is a being among other beings with several positive attributes, such as the cause of the universe and cause of itself, and inherent, achievable, cognitive and namable essence for mankind. Heidegger claims that Metaphysics with its Onto-Theo-logical structure reduced God to a metaphysical notion that lacks any glory for worship and prayer. Thus, the main question of the essay is: Is Avicennian philosophy an Onto-Theo-logical structure? The founding of the research is as follows: First, unlike the theologians, the discussion of God in Avicennian philosophy holds in terms of His mode of existence. Therefore, the simultaneous presence of theology and ontology in the Avicennian philosophy would be excluded. Second, Heidegger's conception of metaphysics is false and confusing, and Avicennian philosophy is also metaphysics but does not consist of the metaphysical properties claimed by Heidegger. Third, although in philosophia prima Ibn Sina speaks of God as a being, he doesn't consider the existence as the truth of God; rather he reflects existence as the implications of the truth of God. To compensate for the cognitive limitations of mankind in metaphysics, he tries to philosophically use the inner possibilities of the teachings of the divinity. In this regard, instead of using the Onto-Theo-logy positive theology, he develops his philosophy based on a negative-positive metaphysic. Fourth, components and implications of Onto-Theo-logy by Heidegger and Marion, Assuming they are right, are not present in the philosophy of Avicenna. In other words, Avicenna's philosophy does not have an Onto-Theo-logical structure.

The leading theory regarding the number of basic elements in classical natural sciences is formulated in the peripatetic school of philosophy, which assumes four basic elements to exist. They propose three possible explanations in support of this theory: First, reasoning based on the position of objects in nature and their natural inclinations, taking into view the qualities of being light or heavy. Second, reasoning by considering fundamental sensible qualities all objects share (hotness, coldness, wetness, dryness). Third, reasoning by dint of composition and analysis. Then, instances of the four classical elements (earth, water, air, and fire) were determined through an inductive method of reasoning. Abou Reihan al-Biruoni and Suhrawardi were critical of this theory and refused to accept fire as a basic element, calling it hot air. Hence, by modifying the criteria behind the classification of basic elements, Suhrawardi categorized them according to their visual qualities and, therefore, reduced the number of elements to three: opaque (Hajez), translucent (Moghtased) and subtle (Latif). In this paper, the arguments deployed by the philosophers of the peripatetic school and constitutive of Suhrawardi's criticism about the four elements was investigated and it was revealed that Suhrawardi's motive in this new method of categorization, in which fire was removed from among basic elements, was more metaphysical, and did not, in fact, abide by the rules of natural sciences.

Importance of soul entity, incorporeality and its end in all religions lead philosophers to pursue reasonable bases for them. The perfection of the soul after death is one of these religious issues that received increased attention among philosophers. Among all Muslim philosophers who rely on their philosophical foundations, Shaik-al-Rais' Abu Ali Ibn Sina (Avicenna) has paid special attention to the questions about soul and its perfection. Thus, the present article investigates the philosophical foundations and views of this great Islamic thinker about the issue of perfection of the soul after death. In other words, I seek to study whether Avicenna`s philosophy can answer the question of perfection of the soul after death or not. To address the question, I review the possibility of perfection in the afterlife and then explain his views about the perfection of the soul after death. Finally, I conclude that he did not have a clear answer to this question but some important points could be found in his works that lead us to have a better understanding of the issue.

What is the ethical world in Avicenna's philosophy and how should man's action be to lead to its construction? The nature of the world of plurality is intellectual because it has been caused by God's will through a hierarchy of intellects. Man can also function as the channel of God's will and add rational forms to the world knowing it rationally. Therefore, the condition of moral action for him is rational knowledge of the world, which will lead to the construction of a rational world. If man's knowledge of the world is derived from any epistemological source other than reason, the world and the rules of human action in it are not known properly. Thus, in order to understand Avicenna's ethical world, we should first understand the nature of the world, and then the nature of man's ethical action in it, and finally, define the nature of the ethical world correctly. Accordingly, this research begins with an attempt to understand the nature of the world, and researching the origin of man's moral behavior, seeks to understand the nature of the world constructed by the addition of the forms caused by man's moral behavior.

I seek to explicate the ways in which the soul is deemed immaterial in two main strands of Islamic philosophy and then consider with the physicalistic approach some arguments for the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I first overview Avicenna's theory of the spiritual incipience (al-ḥ udū th al-rū ḥ ā nī ) of the soul and his version of substance dualism. I will then discuss Mullā Ṣ adrā 's view of the physical incipience (al-ḥ udū th al-jismā nī ) of the soul and how the soul emerges and develops towards immateriality on his account. I then overview and discuss five of the most important arguments presented by these two great Muslim philosophers in favor of the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I will also point out some of the main contemporary physicalistic views of the nature of mind and mental states. I will then argue that arguments for the immateriality of the soul – dealt with here – do not indeed target or challenge any significant versions of contemporary physicalism. I conclude that the most important narrow physicalistic views – such as identity theory – have a very different formation than what Avicenna and Mullā-Sadrā are refuting. Also, the most important wide physicalistic theories – such as the externalist representationalism-are inconsistent with assumptions and readings of materialism in the Islamic philosophy framework and propose other types of physicalism about the mind were not fundamentally considered by the Avicenna and Mullā-Sadrā arguments. Moreover, some of these arguments, in my opinion, involve conflations of epistemological or ontological issues.

In Islamic philosophy, the essence has many properties in which the considerations of essence are one of them. After this issue had been brought up, three key concepts had been raised in the works of Islamic philosophers around the essence that the connection of these concepts created a great deal of difference and conflicts. These three concepts are the concept of 'natural universal', the concept of 'Quiddity qua quiddity' and the concept of 'Nonconditioned quiddity'. There are two popular views among philosophers regarding the relevance of these concepts. The first view considers 'natural universal' and 'Quiddity qua quiddity' to be in accordance with the non-conditioned as a source of division. The second view, contrary to the first view, holds that both of these concepts are consistent with non-conditioned. Ibn Sina is the first one who invented this problem and falls into the second group, and Agha Ali represents a third view that explicitly considers the views of other philosophers to be unfinished and offered a new idea which is the last step in the philosophical improvement of this idea. From Agha Ali's point of view on the considerations of the essence, we can have a better analysis of Essential primary and technical common predications, consideration of the essence of God and some other philosophical issues.

Shams al-Din al-Samarqandi, one of the Avicenna’ s followers in 7th century A. H, is unknown in the history of logic, despite his logical talent and innovations. As is discussed in this article, the reason for this negligence is that Samarqandi`s logical writings, including his most important logical book Sharh-al-Qestas, are still in manuscript form, unlike Avicenna whose books such as al-Shifa, al-Nijat, and Al-isharat wa al-tanbihat were available in most of the times. In this article, by indicating some of his innovations in logic and other subjects, the necessity of textual criticism of Sharh-al-Qestas becomes clear and necessary. In writing his book, he was aware of his previous logicians` books and referred to them frequently, so finding his unique ideas needs deep and exact research. Also, he has deep effects on the subsequent logicians; therefore by reviving his book, it would be possible to find his real position in the history of logic.

Philosophical anthropology is one of the main issues in Ibn Sina's philosophy. Defining the concept of the soul, Ibn Sina states his ideas about human perfection. Thus, questions raised what is the ultimate perfection of a rational soul and what are the sensible criticisms of it? Would Ibn Sina's philosophy answer the questions of modern man on the related issues? Ibn Sina is of the opinion that human perfection is a kind of intellectual perfection achieved through reaching al-ʿ aql al-mustafā d (acquired intellect). Therefore, perfection is achieved in the light of theoretical intellect and practical intellect preliminary paves the way to reach perfection. Ibn Sina's view on perfection flows in the body of Islamic philosophy until the advent of Mulla Sadra's philosophy. He criticized Ibn Sina's thoughts and rebuilt his theory, but he didn't go much beyond it. The crux of Ibn Sina's problem is that he divided various degrees of the soul and didn't pay enough attention to the interference of human will as well as the corporeal and worldly aspects rooted in social and political life.

What factors are considered in a proper scheme of a family pattern and how to boost their effects in a society are serious questions raised in Greek and Islamic practical reasoning as well as modern sociology. The first step in providing a proper family pattern is to review the theoretical ideas in mainstream sociology. One of the leading Muslim philosophers dealing with the issue of family studies and household management is Ibn Sina. In Western Philosophy, on the other hand, Anthony Giddens, a contemporary sociologist, has extensively discussed the issue of family structure. Thus, the present inquiry aims to compare the two scholars' views on a proper family structure and reveal their differences in the theoretical basis and fundamental factors. Carrying out careful analysis and evaluation of the existing literature, first, we study the three aspects of family types, family social functions and the role of relations according to Ibn Sina's views and then study Giddens's ideas about the issue in the light of his theory of democratic family and the pure relationship. Marriage and divorce, development of gender power system, the role of gender relations, and the norms of giving birth to babies are some of the issues of debate between Ibn Sina and Giddens. In other words, Ibn Sina forms a traditional social structure of the family in which gender relations are developed on the traditional structure of gender inequality legitimated at the time, while Giddens promoted an agenda of gender equality and democracy in families based on modern approaches that avoid the traditional patterns.

The main problem of this paper is “ Matter mistake” and “ Formal mistake” and its result is "Matter mistake is meaningless; what is in principle described as correct and incorrect form". Studies showed Avicenna has no statement or proof about Matter Mistake and his definition of logic can be a start point for Classical logic. By accepting this statement, we need to accept a role for Matter Mistake in the fallacy argument. Nasir al-Din Tusi has used it and neglects all Matter Mistakes in fallacy, but on the other hand, Ghotb considered a place for it and so his argument is not consistent with this statement. Ghotb believes that Matter Mistake has no meaning by comparing it to the real world due to the casual and necessity of foundations of knowledge. This belief also exists in Nasir al-Din Tusi's thought but it is due to premises of syllogism and logical definitions. Now we think since these traditional logical discussions are so general and denotation criteria are not the same, so it has no contradiction to consider mistakes accompanying matter.