ANALYSIS OF ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE OF IRAN CASE STUDY OF MEDICINE AND PARACLINICAL SERVICES

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KESHAVARZ HADAD GH.R.; ZOMORODI ANBAJI MAHDIEH

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Journal: Journal of Economic Research Year:2009 | Volume:44 | Issue:87 Page(s): 139-163

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Information Journal Paper

Title

ANALYSIS OF ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE OF IRAN CASE STUDY OF MEDICINE AND PARACLINICAL SERVICES

Author(s)

KESHAVARZ HADAD GH.R. | ZOMORODI ANBAJI MAHDIEH | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

ADVERSE SELECTIONQ3

MORAL HAZARDQ2

HEALTH INSURANCEQ3

IRANQ3

Abstract

This paper aims to estimate a model of demand for HEALTH INSURANCE and medical care in IRAN in the presence of the heterogeneous and latent health status of individual; moreover it tests the asymmetry of information in the HEALTH INSURANCE industry of IRAN. Our dataset consists of whole family budget survey of 2006. The parameters of model are estimated by G.M.M method and the model used in this arthic1e used the minimum assumption about the insurance refound policies, statistical distribution of individual's latent health status, and selection of insurance type.

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APA: Copy

KESHAVARZ HADAD, GH.R., & ZOMORODI ANBAJI, MAHDIEH. (2009). ANALYSIS OF ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE OF IRAN CASE STUDY OF MEDICINE AND PARACLINICAL SERVICES. TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI, 44(87), 139-163. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/12116/en

Vancouver: Copy

KESHAVARZ HADAD GH.R., ZOMORODI ANBAJI MAHDIEH. ANALYSIS OF ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE OF IRAN CASE STUDY OF MEDICINE AND PARACLINICAL SERVICES. TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI[Internet]. 2009;44(87):139-163. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/12116/en

IEEE: Copy

GH.R. KESHAVARZ HADAD, and MAHDIEH ZOMORODI ANBAJI, “ANALYSIS OF ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE OF IRAN CASE STUDY OF MEDICINE AND PARACLINICAL SERVICES,” TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI, vol. 44, no. 87, pp. 139–163, 2009, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/12116/en

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