MORAL HAZARD AND THE INSURANCE MARKET

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MOTALLEBI S.M.M.

مرکز اطلاعات علمی Scientific Information Database (SID) - Trusted Source for Research and Academic Resources

Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: NAMEH-YE-MOFID Year:2003 | Volume:9 | Issue:1 (35 ECONOMICS) Page(s): 41-62

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Information Journal Paper

Title

MORAL HAZARD AND THE INSURANCE MARKET

Author(s)

MOTALLEBI S.M.M. | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

MORAL HAZARDQ4

OPTIMAL CONTRACTQ4

MARKET FAILUREQ2

IMPERFECT INFORMATIONQ4

SUBTLE BEHAVIOUR IN THE INSURANCE MARKETQ4

INSURANCEQ4

PRINCIPLE -AGENT PROBLEMQ4

Abstract

In a condition where two parties establish an economic relation, information always plays an important role. Any subtle behaviour may cause either party to react in away that is not in the interest of the other. In sach a case MORAL HAZARD occurs which leads to MARKET FAILURE. INSURANCE companies that can't observe the supervisory behaviour of the insured people face such a problem, Thus there is a need for designing contracts which involve the insureds and motivate them to increase their supervision. Franchise contracts are considered to be the optimal ones. The MARKET FAILURE can be prevented or the cast can be reduced by franchinsing and the deductible coverage or by government's stimulative intervention through tax and subsidies. Investigations indicate that some tariffs levied by the "Insurance High Council" and also the contract documents lack the due efficiency. It's necessary to reform the contracts and the tariffs using the results drawn from this and other researches.

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APA: Copy

MOTALLEBI, S.M.M.. (2003). MORAL HAZARD AND THE INSURANCE MARKET. NAMEH-YE-MOFID, 9(1 (35 ECONOMICS)), 41-62. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/3414/en

Vancouver: Copy

MOTALLEBI S.M.M.. MORAL HAZARD AND THE INSURANCE MARKET. NAMEH-YE-MOFID[Internet]. 2003;9(1 (35 ECONOMICS)):41-62. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/3414/en

IEEE: Copy

S.M.M. MOTALLEBI, “MORAL HAZARD AND THE INSURANCE MARKET,” NAMEH-YE-MOFID, vol. 9, no. 1 (35 ECONOMICS), pp. 41–62, 2003, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/3414/en

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