ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE DEMAND FOR VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE IN SHIRAZ

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ASHKTORAB N.; BAKHSHOODEH M.

مرکز اطلاعات علمی Scientific Information Database (SID) - Trusted Source for Research and Academic Resources

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Journal: Journal Of Development Economics and Planning Year:2015 | Volume:4 | Issue:1 Page(s): 0-0

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Title

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE DEMAND FOR VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE IN SHIRAZ

Author(s)

ASHKTORAB N. | BAKHSHOODEH M. | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

INSURANCEQ2

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATIONQ2

MORAL HAZARDQ1

PROBITQ2

ORDERED PROBITQ2

Abstract

In recent years, the role and importance of information have been quickly entered into the theories and policies. All reforms of health policies, including voluntary health INSURANCE are necessarily in need of addressing the problem of ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION. The present study examined the relationship between health risk and the probability of voluntary health INSURANCE using PROBIT model. Then, the causes of the correlation between voluntary health information and health risk were identified by ordered PROBIT model. The results of the study show a negative correlation between health risk and probability of voluntary health INSURANCE which is related to MORAL HAZARDs in INSURANCE market. The main reason is the incompetence and inefficiency of INSURANCE system. According to the study, the negative correlation is related to the information that INSURANCE companies obtained and screenings in the INSURANCE market by choosing strategies for dealing with MORAL HAZARD not the heterogeneous risk preferences of individuals.

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APA: Copy

ASHKTORAB, N., & BAKHSHOODEH, M.. (2015). ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE DEMAND FOR VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE IN SHIRAZ. JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND PLANNING, 4(1 ), 0-0. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/358712/en

Vancouver: Copy

ASHKTORAB N., BAKHSHOODEH M.. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE DEMAND FOR VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE IN SHIRAZ. JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND PLANNING[Internet]. 2015;4(1 ):0-0. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/358712/en

IEEE: Copy

N. ASHKTORAB, and M. BAKHSHOODEH, “ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE DEMAND FOR VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE IN SHIRAZ,” JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND PLANNING, vol. 4, no. 1 , pp. 0–0, 2015, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/358712/en

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