AN INVESTIGATION OF OPEC & OECD BEHAVIOR IN A BILATERAL MONOPOLY GAME AND OIL TRADE BENEFITS SHARING

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ABRISHAMI H.; GOLESTAN SH.

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Journal: Iranian Journal of Trade Studies Year:2004 | Volume:8 | Issue:31 Page(s): 3-3

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Title

AN INVESTIGATION OF OPEC & OECD BEHAVIOR IN A BILATERAL MONOPOLY GAME AND OIL TRADE BENEFITS SHARING

Author(s)

ABRISHAMI H. | GOLESTAN SH. | Issue Writer Certificate

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Abstract

In the present paper, the behavior of two organizations namely OPEC and OECD are analyzed as major and active players in the global oil market within the framework of a Finitely Repeated Bilateral Monopoly Game. This analysis shows that on the strength of Schelling point solution, in this game as a result of applying consistent and long term strategies by both players, OPEC is present as the weak bargainer compared to OECD members countries. In this framework, OPEC oil strategy is influenced by economic, political and security considerations in which savers group have considerable role in decision making and decide oil strategy of this organization. On the other hand, OECD oil strategy takes form in accordance with three motivations of economic, safety (energy safety) and in some points environmental. The interaction between the interests of OPEC and OECD leads to the establishment of the equilibrium price in the oil market. This pricing system generates the greatest benefit for the OECD members countries through tariffs and taxes. Time series analysis and study of long term relations among the variables confirm the above theory.

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APA: Copy

ABRISHAMI, H., & GOLESTAN, SH.. (2004). AN INVESTIGATION OF OPEC & OECD BEHAVIOR IN A BILATERAL MONOPOLY GAME AND OIL TRADE BENEFITS SHARING. IRANIAN JOURNAL OF TRADE STUDIES (IJTS), 8(31), 3-3. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/358723/en

Vancouver: Copy

ABRISHAMI H., GOLESTAN SH.. AN INVESTIGATION OF OPEC & OECD BEHAVIOR IN A BILATERAL MONOPOLY GAME AND OIL TRADE BENEFITS SHARING. IRANIAN JOURNAL OF TRADE STUDIES (IJTS)[Internet]. 2004;8(31):3-3. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/358723/en

IEEE: Copy

H. ABRISHAMI, and SH. GOLESTAN, “AN INVESTIGATION OF OPEC & OECD BEHAVIOR IN A BILATERAL MONOPOLY GAME AND OIL TRADE BENEFITS SHARING,” IRANIAN JOURNAL OF TRADE STUDIES (IJTS), vol. 8, no. 31, pp. 3–3, 2004, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/358723/en

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