SEIGNIORAGE AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: FURTHER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

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JAFARI SAMIMI A.

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Journal: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES (THE JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES) Year:2001 | Volume:8 | Issue:3 Page(s): 17-28

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Title

SEIGNIORAGE AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: FURTHER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Author(s)

JAFARI SAMIMI A. | Issue Writer Certificate

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to determine the association between Central bank independence and seigniorage in developing countries. Theoretically, more central bank independence would mean less reliance of government on seigniorage since the decision to raise any revenue from seigniorage is left to the Central bank. Although some caution is needed owing to the definition, measurement and data limitations, the empirical cross country evidence from the present paper using a sample of 40 developing countries for the period 1974-1990 indicate a surprising positive and statistically significant association between seigniorage and the Central bank independence index based on office term of the Central bank governors in these countries. The results suggest that we should either interpret a longer term in office as an indication of low level of independence in developing countries or to conclude that the Central banks may keep and even spend part of the seigniorage in these countries. Bearing in mind the institutional and cultural relations, the author thinks that the first interpretation is more justifiable in these countries.

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APA: Copy

JAFARI SAMIMI, A.. (2001). SEIGNIORAGE AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: FURTHER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES (THE JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES), 8(3), 17-28. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/361187/en

Vancouver: Copy

JAFARI SAMIMI A.. SEIGNIORAGE AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: FURTHER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES (THE JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES)[Internet]. 2001;8(3):17-28. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/361187/en

IEEE: Copy

A. JAFARI SAMIMI, “SEIGNIORAGE AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: FURTHER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE,” INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES (THE JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES), vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 17–28, 2001, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/361187/en

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