ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EFFICIENCY IN IRANIAN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INSURANCE MARKET (THE CASE OF IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY)

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MOUSAVI SAJAD SEYYEDE HAMIDEH; RAGHFAR HOSSEIN

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Paper Information

Journal: IRANIAN JOURNAL OF INSURANCE RESEARCH (SANAAT-E-BIMEH) Year:2010 | Volume:25 | Issue:2 (98) Page(s): 51-78

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Information Journal Paper

Title

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EFFICIENCY IN IRANIAN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INSURANCE MARKET (THE CASE OF IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY)

Author(s)

MOUSAVI SAJAD SEYYEDE HAMIDEH | RAGHFAR HOSSEIN | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATIONQ3

COLLISION INSURANCEQ2

RISK AVERSIONQ3

ADVERSE SELECTIONQ3

MORAL HAZARDQ3

Abstract

Insurance Industry’s efficiency has strong relation with correct & precise characteristics of Insured and insurer’s. Information asymmetry between insurer and insured which leads to several problems, like ADVERSE SELECTION, is a case that studies in economics of information area.Existence of ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION in insurance market appears in two forms; i.e. MORAL HAZARD and ADVERSE SELECTION; both are factors which lead to decrease of insurance market’s efficiency. The purpose of this research is surveying existence of ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION in Iranianc insurance market (The caes of Iran Insurance company). We used parametric methods (probit equation, bivariate probit) and definitions and priciples of risk and offered insurance coverage in Cohen (2005) in order to test ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION. The main prediction of economics of information models, in the case of information asymmetry (i.e. postive correlation between risk and higher insurance coverage) has been tested in this research. Evidence shows the existence of information assymetry in this market.

Cites

EXPLAINING THE DEMAND FUNCTION OF ENDOWMENT ASSURANCE (A THEORETICAL APPROACH)

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APA: Copy

MOUSAVI SAJAD, SEYYEDE HAMIDEH, & RAGHFAR, HOSSEIN. (2010). ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EFFICIENCY IN IRANIAN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INSURANCE MARKET (THE CASE OF IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY). IRANIAN JOURNAL OF INSURANCE RESEARCH (SANAAT-E-BIMEH), 25(2 (98)), 51-78. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/100836/en

Vancouver: Copy

MOUSAVI SAJAD SEYYEDE HAMIDEH, RAGHFAR HOSSEIN. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EFFICIENCY IN IRANIAN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INSURANCE MARKET (THE CASE OF IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY). IRANIAN JOURNAL OF INSURANCE RESEARCH (SANAAT-E-BIMEH)[Internet]. 2010;25(2 (98)):51-78. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/100836/en

IEEE: Copy

SEYYEDE HAMIDEH MOUSAVI SAJAD, and HOSSEIN RAGHFAR, “ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EFFICIENCY IN IRANIAN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INSURANCE MARKET (THE CASE OF IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY),” IRANIAN JOURNAL OF INSURANCE RESEARCH (SANAAT-E-BIMEH), vol. 25, no. 2 (98), pp. 51–78, 2010, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/100836/en

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