In the first stance, constructivism is against realism. While realists insist that
our true knowledge corresponds to reality, constructivists reject idea of
correspondence and claim that the mind is independent from reality in its
work of providing constructs. Thus, so far as knowledge is concerned,
constructivist psychologists like Geoge Kelly and Jean Piaget have appealed to
the notion of adjustment, rather than correspondence, to reality. Even though
constructivists are right in claiming that correspondence to reality is
problematic, their critique is tenable solely in the case of naive realism.
However, it is argued that we can keep talking about correspondence to
reality without rejecting the constructive ability of the mind. This is because,
epistemologically speking, the notion of correspondence is crucial for the
truth of our theories, while on the other hand, adjustment to reality falls short
of being the adequate criterion for truth. The instrumentalist position on
knowledge constructs from distinguishing between the adequacy and truth of
constructs. It is concluded that we can Keep the insights of constructivists on
the theory-leadenness of facts without leaving aside the notion of
correspondence to reality. In fact, constructivism meeds to be more realistic.